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Explainer B05 For Buyers · Deal Sourcing Cluster

Initial engagement to LOI — the early-deal sequence.

The window between first conversation and signed LOI is short and asymmetric. The buyer who arrives prepared anchors the deal at defensible economics. The buyer who arrives eager pays the cost in pricing tolerance and exclusivity terms.

The interval between a buyer's first conversation with a seller and a signed Letter of Intent is the most asymmetric part of the deal. The seller has the information advantage — they know the book, the financials, the producer dynamics, the carrier appointments. The buyer has the leverage advantage — they have time, alternatives, and capital. The buyer who arrives prepared converts the leverage into pricing; the buyer who doesn't gives the leverage back.

Curiosity discipline, not eagerness.

The first call sets the deal's tone. Two postures produce different outcomes.

The eager buyer signals high interest in the first 10 minutes — asks for financials immediately, talks pricing in the first call, expresses urgency, and rolls up to the seller's anchor number with minimal pushback. The seller correctly reads this as a buyer who will pay near the anchor. The deal proceeds at unfavorable economics.

The disciplined buyer signals informed curiosity. Asks about the business — producer mix, carrier appointments, growth strategy, exit timing — before talking pricing. Treats the conversation as bilateral due diligence. Doesn't disclose the buyer's pricing thesis until the buyer has enough information to defend it. The seller correctly reads this as a buyer who will negotiate on substance.

Pricing discipline starts in the first call. The buyer who signals "I will pay near your anchor" pays near the anchor. The buyer who signals "I will pay what the deal mathematics support" pays what the mathematics support.

Range, not number.

The initial valuation that supports an LOI is not a definitive number. It is a defensible range — typically 0.5×–1.0× EBITDA wide — anchored on three legs.

Leg 1

Normalized EBITDA × multiple.

  • Buyer's own normalization, not seller's adjusted.
  • Multiple band defended by revenue tier and growth rate.
  • The conservative leg of the range.
Leg 2

Comparable transactions.

  • Recent comparable deals in the same tier and geography.
  • Adjustment for book composition and growth.
  • Triangulates the buyer's multiple band.
Leg 3

Strategic-value adjustment.

  • Carrier-appointment overlap or unique fit.
  • Geographic or LOB strategic value.
  • The "why this deal" premium, capped at 0.5× EBITDA.

The LOI proposes a range — for example, "purchase price $9.5M–$11.0M based on indicative due diligence" — with the upper bound conditional on diligence confirming the buyer's assumptions. The range gives the buyer room to retrade on material discovery without breaching good faith; the bracket gives the seller confidence the deal isn't a moving target.

What the LOI actually does.

The LOI is not a contract to buy. It is a framework that structures the diligence period — pricing range, exclusivity duration, diligence scope, expense allocation, walk-away conditions. Six provisions matter.

  • Pricing range and structure. Headline price range, cash-at-close percentage, seller-note terms if any, earnout if any, rollover equity if any. The LOI should reflect the structure the buyer can actually fund — not an idealized term sheet that breaks at financing-commitment stage.
  • Exclusivity period. Typically 45–90 days. Sufficient time to complete diligence and draft definitive agreements without lock-out being so long the seller resents it. Shorter is better when the buyer is prepared; longer is necessary when the buyer needs more financing-commitment time.
  • Diligence scope. What the buyer expects to verify and what the seller agrees to provide. Includes financial statements, AMS reports, carrier appointment letters, employment agreements, customer contracts, legal documents, real-estate leases. Vague scope produces friction at every diligence document request.
  • Expense allocation. Each side typically bears its own expenses except in specific scenarios (broken-deal fees, expense reimbursement on material adverse changes). Clear allocation prevents disputes mid-diligence.
  • Confidentiality and standstill. The seller agrees not to shop the deal during exclusivity; the buyer agrees not to disclose deal-sensitive information. Standstill provisions protect both sides.
  • Walk-away conditions. Material adverse change, regulatory consents not obtained, financing not committed, diligence findings outside negotiated tolerance. Specific enumeration prevents post-LOI surprise.

The LOI is also where the buyer's negotiation leverage is highest. Once exclusivity is signed, the seller's alternative bidders are gone for the duration. Material renegotiation post-LOI requires either ethical retrade grounds (discovery of material previously-undisclosed facts) or extension of exclusivity in exchange for revised terms.

The cluster pairs with the broader Pillar — Deal Sourcing Cluster — and feeds the diligence and negotiation work covered in the acquisition-process navigation cluster.

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